Figure 1įramework for institutional change by Ensminger (1992, 10) with an extension by Haller (2010).īargaining power as the ability “to get something one wants from others” ( Ensminger 1992, 7) may arise from social position, economic wealth, or the ability to influence the ideology of others (see also Knight 1992). This framework (see Figure 1) is particularly suitable for our analysis as it focuses on the factors scholars have found to be crucial for property rights transformations on the local level: the behaviour of competing individual actors striving to achieve the institutional outcome with the best distributive effects or other individual benefits ( Anderson and Hill 1990 Lesorogol 2003 Mwangi 2007), shaped by their ideology, preferences and bargaining power ( Ensminger and Knight 1997 Di Gregorio et al. This study uses the institutional change framework provided by Ensminger (1992). The penultimate section discusses the present case in relation to findings from the literature, followed by a conclusion. Section 4 presents the empirical results, portraying the current and former property rights regimes, the processes of privatization and the emergence of curtailment, as well as its implementation and the difficulties associated with it. This is followed by a section on methods. Section 2 gives an overview on the local livelihoods, especially the use of Euphorbia stenoclada, the types of institutions governing natural resource use, and the Tanalana people’s social organization. The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the theoretical framework for our study. Why did the local communities fail to implement and enforce the curtailment?
How did the process of legal curtailment of private property rights by local communities develop?
What are the mechanisms underlying the assertion of new private property rights via spontaneous enclosures? The paper analyses this transformation of property rights, and especially the successful assertion of private property rights and the failed implementation of a legal curtailment of privatization, by addressing three research questions:
However, implementation and enforcement of these rules has been so weak that privatization continues unabated and is meanwhile widely accepted. This situation led to a spontaneous step-by-step privatization of trees by livestock owners followed by attempts by village communities to curtail privatization and the unequal distribution that resulted from it by establishing new local rules. In recent decades, however, several factors have led to a decrease in the quality and quantity of the stocks of the important fodder tree samata ( Euphorbia stenoclada).
The Tanalana people have traditionally held all pastoral resources in open access. The present paper adds to our understanding of local property rights transformation by discussing the processes, mechanisms, and forces that led to the establishment of private property rights to a pastoral common pool resource among the Tanalana people in southwest Madagascar. However, to date, little empirical work has been done to establish the processes and mechanisms that translate the motivation of individual users or groups into a stable transformation of property rights ( Mwangi 2007). 2000 Cleaver 2002 Lesorogol 2003, 2008 Desta and Coppock 2004 Kamara et al.
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Much effort has gone into identifying the drivers of such property rights transformations: population growth, immigration, resource use conflicts, commercialization, infrastructural development, technological change and intensified agriculture ( Ensminger 1996, 1997 Woodhouse et al. Privatization of pastoral common pool resources is a widespread phenomenon in Africa and is often initiated by the local user communities ( Behnke 1985 Ensminger 1997 Lesorogol 2003).